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Recent scholarship offers compelling evidence on the negative impact of in-
come inequality on satisfaction with democracy. This article studies whether 
the impact of inequality on evaluations of the democratic process varies for 
different groups in the population and over time. The central argument is that 
the impact of inequality is conditional on individual characteristics and expe-
rience. Young adults and members of the 1990s generation should be more 
sensitive to income inequality compared to older generations. To answer this 
question, we use cumulative six-wave data from the European Social Survey 
(2002-2012), matched with income inequality estimates from the Standard-
ized World Income Inequality Dataset (2014). Results from a series of mixed-
effects models reveal that higher levels of income inequality are associated 
with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy, but with a disproportionate 
negative influence on young adults compared to older citizens and also on the 
1990s cohort compared to all other cohorts.
Keywords: Income Inequality, Satisfaction with Democracy, Young Adults, 
Mixed-Effects Models, European Social Survey
Introduction
Political scientists have long argued that economic inequality is to a large extent 
incompatible with normative principles of democratic governance (Anderson and 
Singer, 2008; Dahl, 2006). A number of recent comparative studies have empirical-
ly evaluated this assumption and have argued that the distribution of income should 
also be evaluated as an important indicator of political performance, similar to le-
vels of economic development. Results from analyses which investigate how ag-
gregate public opinion reacts to shifts in inequality have so far offered compelling 
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evidence that the latter is in fact a depressor of democratic satisfaction (Andersen, 
2012; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). Satisfaction with de-
mocracy is of primary interest to the previous studies and the focus of our study 
because it represents an immediate and faithful barometer of the performance of 
the political system when measured against the yardstick of democratic principles. 
Satisfaction with democracy can discriminate between political systems that fail to 
produce anticipated outputs and those that successfully do so. As mass dissatisfac-
tion can forebode the appearance of political instability, under the form of extremist 
political or social movements, ascertaining the influence of aggregate-level factors 
on satisfaction can better allow us to stem the tide of popular discontent before ir-
reparable harm is done to existing institutions.
The analyses mentioned (e.g. Krieckhaus et al., 2013), however, do not take 
a closer look at whether the impact of inequality on evaluations of the democratic 
process varies for different groups in the population and over time, which we aim 
to address in this paper. We argue that the differences in the effect of income in-
equality on satisfaction with democracy are conditional upon individual character-
istics and experiences (similar to Anderson and Singer, 2008), most notably age 
and cohort differences. While we expect that economic inequality might have a dif-
ferential impact across age groups, our primary interest is in seeing to what extent 
the young and the members of the 1990s generation have been disproportionately 
influenced by rising income inequality, when compared to adults and other cohorts. 
Examining the variation in the effect for different age groups and cohorts is moti-
vated by previous studies on life-cycle and generational effects. The impact of in-
come inequality on youth attitudes also seems particularly important in the context 
of the recent economic crisis, as young people are more likely to be affected by 
the decline in wages, are most vulnerable to layoffs and are least protected by rises 
in social transfers. Citizens who spent the majority of their formative years in the 
1990s are also of particular interest given that the levels of income inequality have 
seen a particular rise starting in the mid-1980s in Western democracies and in 1990 
in all new EU members states (for Western Europe, see Kenworthy and Pontusson, 
2005: 452). To answer this question, we use cumulative six-wave data from the 
European Social Survey (2002-2012) (henceforth, ESS), matched with income in-
equality estimates from the Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset (hence-
forth, SWIID) (Solt, 2009). Results from a series of mixed-effects models reveal 
that higher levels of income inequality are associated with lower levels of satis-
faction with democracy, but with a disproportionate negative influence on young 
adults compared to older citizens and also on the 1990s cohort compared to all other 
cohorts.
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Income Inequality and Democratic Distemper
Increasing inequality in post-industrial democracies in recent decades has renewed 
scholarly interest in the study of the possible consequences of inequality on a wide 
range of socio-economic problems. While previous research was focused prima-
rily on the analyses of income inequality in the United States and the United King-
dom, similar trends towards unequal distributions of income on the Old Continent, 
the global recession of the past few years, as well as the considerable public sup-
port that bottom-up movements such as Occupy have received have evoked acade-
mic and political attention towards the evolution of inequality. Focus has especially 
shifted towards European democracies, which have, on average, faced sluggish eco-
nomic growth in the past decades (Fredriksen, 2012), and where a long tradition of 
strong welfare states has produced marked sensitivity to even moderate increases 
in inequality. Income inequality is still notably lower in Europe than in the United 
States, but inequality in Europe has risen substantially since the mid-1980s, result-
ing in a distribution of income that is more unequal than in the average OECD coun-
try (ibid.). For instance, income inequality has risen more from 2007 to 2010 than 
in the preceding 12 years (OECD, 2013a; 2013b) and is higher now than in the past, 
even in the more egalitarian countries such as Sweden and Germany.
While studies on income inequality cross disciplinary boundaries, they all 
share a common interest in identifying the pathways through which income in-
equality can be harmful to society. There are numerous reasons why rising inequal-
ity should be a cause for concern for academics and citizens alike. Multiple societal 
effects have been attributed to increased income inequality, encompassing, but cer-
tainly not limited to ‘health status and life expectancy, crime and community break-
down, political power, and temporal patterns of income and poverty mobility, to 
intergenerational immobility and the transmission of poverty from one generation 
to the next [...]’ (Salverda et al., 2009: 6). Perhaps the strongest reason for which 
income inequality and its effects on society should be more thoroughly pursued, 
though, is the considerable scope that exists for political decisions to impact the in-
equality trend. In spite of a general agreement that the gap in disposable incomes 
between extremes of the distribution is a direct consequence of the changes in the 
labor markets driven by outside factors such as globalization and technological de-
velopment (Braun, 1991), trends in some countries, such as France or Sweden, sug-
gest that politics is not powerless. Governments can influence income gaps directly 
through implementing careful regulatory and policy reforms such as wage-setting 
mechanisms, social transfers or market regulation.
Political scientists have long assumed that, with rising income inequality, there 
are reasons to suspect that citizens everywhere will find the discrepancy between 
democratic tenets and unequal economic outcomes glaring. Citizens are the back-
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bone of representative democracies and their support of political institutions and 
processes is crucial for the stability of democracies (Anderson and Singer, 2008). 
This is especially true when we consider growing indications that citizens in all es-
tablished democracies are becoming more critical towards political actors, institu-
tions and democratic regimes (Dalton, 2004; 2006). Growing dissatisfaction with 
democracy among citizens might create inherent instability in political systems, 
with bottom-up pressure for social change as well as the appearance of extremist 
or populist parties, or of anti-establishment politicians. As Lipset and Powell warn 
us, pushes for radical changes from below might have serious consequences for the 
survival and the quality of established democracies (Lipset, 1959; Powell, 1982). 
To name only a few, increased dissatisfaction might have an impact on electoral 
volatility, turnout, or engagement in non-conventional political activities such as 
protests and demonstrations, and even affect citizens’ compliance with performing 
public services (Dahl, 2006; Norris, 1999).
Not all facets of citizen support should be equally affected. Building on Eas-
ton’s original distinction between diffuse and specific support (Easton, 1957; 1965; 
Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999) debates have revolved around the understanding that 
citizens might have distinct preferences towards different levels of political ob-
jects. We postulate here that a highly unequal distribution of income in a country 
might be the tipping point for an increase of dissatisfaction among the public di-
rected towards more specific objects. Our understanding of specific political ob-
jects refers primarily to ‘attitudes towards the way democracy works in practice 
in a particular country’ (Linde and Ekman, 2003: 393). According to the notion of 
system outputs developed by Easton, attitudes towards political objects rely on the 
ability of political authorities and the regime to produce desired economic and po-
litical outcomes. Governments should solve social problems and not create them; 
if economic inequality is exacerbated, citizens might punish their governments at 
election time or could exhibit negative evaluations of the regime’s performance in 
their country.
Theories of democracy also provide an implicit argument for a connection be-
tween growing inequality and citizens’ attitudes towards regime performance. Some 
scholars, most notably John Rawls and Amartya Sen, argued that liberal democracy 
presupposes a certain degree of equitable provision of resources which, in turn, re-
quires a certain level of redistribution (Sen, 2009; Rawls, 1993). In this understand-
ing liberal democracies can best function in economically egalitarian societies. At 
the foundation of every such democracy lies the ideal of intrinsic political equality, 
which implies ‘that the good or interest of each person must be given equal consi-
deration’ (Dahl, 2006: 4). It is embedded in those foundational principles that gua-
rantee equality under the law, equal political rights, equal rights to personal security 
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and some measure of privacy, basic economic security, and rights to education and 
information. Every citizen is entitled to benefit from those rights through participa-
tion in elections, by running for and serving in elective offices, by having access to 
independent sources of information, or through participation in various associations 
and organizations. The normative principle of political equality presupposes that 
different democratic outcomes should be a result of differences in preferences and 
interest and not a result of unequal distribution of resources.
The literature on the political consequences of economic inequality is still rela-
tively novel, especially with a focus on Europe. Until recently, political scientists 
have thought that a link between inequality and citizens’ satisfaction with regime 
performance must be strong, especially considering the correspondence between 
rising inequality and weakening of the support for representative institutions in 
most unequal countries such as the United States and Latin America (Anderson and 
Singer, 2008). As Anderson and Singer note, however, scholars have ‘rarely worried 
about examining it in much detail’ (ibid.: 573). Several new studies offer compel-
ling pieces of evidence that strongly suggest that in countries with higher income 
inequality citizens show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy (Andersen, 
2012; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). What is more, a number 
of studies also found that economic inequality matters both for political attitudes 
and behavior. Starting with Solt’s (2008) path-breaking cross-national analysis of 
the effects of income inequality on turnout and political engagement, a host of re-
sults have attested to the powerful deleterious impact of inequality (Anderson and 
Just, 2012; Galbraith and Hale, 2008; Lister, 2007; Solt, 2010). The range of out-
comes examined includes, in addition to turnout, political participation (displaying 
badges, signing petitions, attending demonstrations, etc.), the frequency of political 
discussion with friends and neighbors, interpersonal trust or social and cultural par-
ticipation (Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 2012).
 Sensitive Youth: Conditional Effects of Inequality on Satisfaction
New research on the link between inequality and satisfaction is partly driven by the 
upsurge in contextual studies of political behavior. Equipped with survey data col-
lections that enable systematic, cross-country comparisons, researchers are increas-
ingly interested in the impact of macro-political environments on political attitudes 
and behavior. Studies of citizens’ attitudes towards representative processes in their 
countries have moved beyond micro explanations and towards identifying those 
institutions and structural conditions which might explain cross-country heteroge-
neity in citizens’ evaluations – as Anderson and Singer emphasize, ‘the study of 
behavioral politics in a comparative perspective is almost unavoidably contingent’ 
(2008: 570). New frontiers of macro-micro studies focus on the impact of structural 
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features on individual behaviors, and results from older studies on macro-micro 
relationships are often reduced to including various individual traits as simple re-
gression controls. However, we must not forget that the individual level character-
istics also matter in explaining attitudes towards the system. Citizens who are more 
educated, who are employed and those who have higher levels of political interest 
are also more critical towards the way democracy works in their country. Support 
will vary across the socioeconomic spectrum, and accordingly, income inequality 
should not have the same effect across subgroups of the population.
To our knowledge, only a few analyses of the impact of economic inequality 
on satisfaction with democracy also check whether the effect of income inequality 
on attitudes is the same across subgroups of the population. Anderson and Singer 
(2008) find that inequality has a more corrosive impact on evaluations of demo-
cracy for citizens on the Left of the political spectrum. In a similar vein, Krieckhaus 
and colleagues (2013) suggest that the reduction in democratic support in highly 
unequal countries is slightly less severe amongst the poor (see also Solt, 2008; Lan-
cee and Van de Werfhorst, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, none so far have 
examined this relationship from an age and cohort perspective, as potential mediat-
ing factors. We add to this literature by taking a closer look at whether the impact of 
inequality on evaluations of the democratic process varies for different age groups 
and cohorts in the population.
Although most analyses of satisfaction with democracy include age as a con-
trol variable, the impact of age on satisfaction is strikingly inconclusive given both 
the direction and the magnitude of the effect. For instance, Schäfer (2012) finds a 
non-linear effect of age, whereby young and elderly citizens have more positive 
evaluations of regime performance compared to middle age groups. On the other 
hand, Anderson and Guillory (1997) report a significant effect in only three coun-
tries in their sample. Younger respondents have lower levels of satisfaction than 
older respondents in Portugal and Spain, but in Denmark this effect is the opposite. 
We do not have specific expectations regarding the levels of satisfaction with de-
mocracy among age groups. As Anderson and Guillory suggest, satisfaction with 
democracy will vary across countries and age groups. However, our particular pre-
diction is that youth attitudes towards the system of liberal democracies should be-
come more negative in situations of higher income inequality.
We base this prediction on previous research which strongly supports our claim 
that age group differences in the levels of satisfaction with democracy should be 
more carefully examined. A significant number of studies show that young adults 
differ from their older counterparts with regard to political participation, political 
attitudes and political values. It is well known that younger citizens are less like-
ly to vote, to become members of political parties, and that they have less stable 
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party identifications (e.g. Sloam, 2012; Norris, 2002; Dalton, 2011). They are also 
more likely to question the status quo, and share more idealistic and universalistic 
values than older citizens. Anderson and Just accurately and pithily sum it up by 
noting that ‘younger citizens often are the sources of instability, innovation, and 
change’ (2012: 306). More importantly, an individual’s position in the life cycle 
might determine the way in which they interpret new information. Younger adults 
who are more likely to question the status quo and who share more universalistic 
values might also be more sensitive to negative changes in the distribution of dis-
posable income. To a certain extent, the theoretical mechanism behind this expecta-
tion relies on the inherent sensitivity of youth during their transition towards adult-
hood.
The alternative mechanism is based on differing economic implications of in-
equality for different age groups, which is particularly important in the context of 
the current economic crisis. New research in political economy suggests that the 
recent economic downturn has brought about additional struggles for young peo-
ple in their twenties. As highlighted in a recent International Trade Union report, 
‘overall youth unemployment has overtaken adult unemployment, further confirm-
ing the fact that young people are more vulnerable to economic shocks and are the 
“first out” and “last in” in times of crisis’ (2012: 3). Young adults should have the 
strongest response to the crisis, not only because their rates of unemployment are 
seeing the largest annual rise recorded in the last 20 years compared to all other age 
groups in the population, but also because they did not have a say in the policies that 
brought about such results. In the context of the crisis’s aftermath, young people are 
more likely to be affected by the current decline in wages, they are most vulnerable 
to layoffs, and they are least protected by increases in social transfers (ILO, 2013). 
We are also aware that the long periods of economic insecurity might affect all age 
groups equally, but for youth the economic environment is particularly threatening 
at the present, during their formative years. That said, we do not exclude the pos-
sibility that the recent global crisis might have a negative impact on all citizens, as 
influences of income inequality should also vary through time.
Additional support for our expectations comes from research on generational 
or cohort effects (e.g. Neundorf and Niemi, 2014). Citizens’ evaluations might not 
be affected only by their position in the life cycle, but also by the sum of social 
and economic experiences that marked the period in ‘which individuals first step 
out into the world as independent adults’ (Delli Carpini, 1989: 20; see also Torney-
Purta, 2004). After a period of intense instability at the threshold of maturity a set 
of attitudes, such as partisanship, political interest, or one’s predisposition to par-
ticipate in politics, become largely stable across the life cycle (Alwin and Krosnick, 
1991; Beck and Jennings, 1982). The catalysts for such attitude crystallization are 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 51-73
58
to be found not only in major political events (the Vietnam War, the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall, or the collapse of Communism), but also in short periods of high-intensity 
political activity, such as an election campaign (Sears and Valentino, 1997). From 
this perspective, citizens born in the 1970s and 1980s and who spent the majority 
of their most formative years throughout the 1990s or 2000s – a period of rising 
inequalities and much more precarious economic conditions – have reasons to feel 
more deprived than their parents, and they might be more sensitive to changes in the 
economic environment today. Researchers now refer to the phenomenon of ‘pro-
longed adulthood’, since young adults are assuming their family and work responsi-
bilities much later than they did 50 years ago (Arnett, 2006). The period of identity 
exploration and volatility in political attitudes and behavior lasts much longer, and 
it is largely a consequence of volatile economic conditions (e.g. Furlong and Cart-
mel, 2006). We, thus, expect to find a parallel age-cohort effect, whereby attitudinal 
and behavioral differences result both from psychological changes over life cycle 
and shared formative experiences. 
Data and Methods
The dataset on which the analyses are conducted is the six-wave ESS spanning most 
countries in Europe between 2002 and 2012, with representative samples of citizens 
in each country. For reasons dealing with macro-level data availability and the lack 
of measurement at multiple points in time, Kosovo and Albania have been excluded 
from the analysis. The dependent variable for our analyses is a respondent’s self-
reported satisfaction with democracy: ‘[...] on the whole, how satisfied are you with 
the way democracy works in [country]?’ In the ESS, this variable is measured on an 
11-point scale, with higher values designating a higher degree of satisfaction with 
democracy. It is important to reiterate here a point which was made in the introduc-
tory section as well: the question does not tap support for democracy as a normative 
ideal (Linde and Ekman, 2003), but rather a person’s support for the performance of 
the democratic regime currently in place. At the individual level, the main theoreti-
cal predictors of interest are respondent’s age (by which we probe life-cycle effects) 
and year of birth (cohort effect). 
As we want to test citizens who came of age during times when income inequal-
ity started to rise, we have chosen to include a dummy variable measuring whether 
respondents belong to the cohort born after 1970 or not. Respondents born in this 
period have spent the majority of their formative years during the 1990s or the 2000s 
(for a similar approach, see Grasso, 2014). Since the ESS covers a relatively short 
period, we are unable to directly test the parallel age-cohort effect, as surveys do not 
include respondents who were young when the data was collected and were born 
prior to the 1970s. However, by using an indicator for the 1990-2000s cohort and 
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age we are able to partially control the confounding cohort effect, and vice versa. 
Another reason for opting for a cohort dummy, rather than identifying political gene-
rations through a categorical variable for several cohorts, is that we want to include 
both old and new European democracies. A classical assignment of political genera-
tions, such as the pre-WWI generation, the silent generation or the lost generation 
(e.g. ibid.), simply does not travel well across our sample of countries. Similarly, a 
typology used in the case of post-Communist countries (Mieriņa and Cers, 2014) has 
little applicability in the Western European context. However, we argue that in both 
Eastern and Western European contexts respondents who have spent their formative 
years during the 90s or 00s have experienced changes in both political landscape 
(end of the Cold War and the ensuing optimism) and economic landscape (a shift 
toward neo-liberal market capitalism).
Other established individual-level predictors were included as controls. A re-
spondent’s gender was added as a dichotomous predictor. A person’s education, 
measured by the number of years of completed education, was included in all mo-
dels. A respondent’s income, measured on a 10-point scale, was also used as a con-
trol. At the level of political attitudes, we only include a measure of the extent of 
political interest. The indicator measures the extent to which the respondent is in-
terested in politics on a 4-point scale, ranging from “not at all interested” to “very 
interested”. All variables at the individual level were group-mean centered to obtain 
proper estimates of the within-country-year effect of a variable on the individual-
level satisfaction with democracy (see Enders and Tofighi, 2007).
Information at the individual level was merged with country-level data regard-
ing income inequality from Solt’s SWIID, version 5.0 (Solt, 2009). We use net 
Gini, which captures the overall inequality in disposable incomes, and not market 
incomes or wealth. Post-transfer incomes are a more appropriate measure of income 
inequality given that we are interested in the effects of Gini on public evaluations 
of democratic performance, which should necessarily take into consideration any 
country differences in redistributive policies implemented to reduce differences in 
market incomes. SWIID contains plausible values for the net Gini index of inequal-
ity that go as far back as the 1960s for all advanced democracies in the sample, and 
usually as far back as the 1980s for the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The ‘price’ paid for such coverage is increased uncertainty in the estimates 
for inequality generated by the multiple imputation procedure used. To address this, 
each model specification was run 100 times, with the 100 plausible values for the 
Gini index provided in the SWIID dataset; estimates and their standard errors were 
subsequently pooled using Rubin’s rules (Rubin, 1987). 
The models tested with these predictors are three-level mixed-effects models 
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002) where satisfaction with 
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democracy is a dependent variable. Although the ESS does not have a sufficiently 
prolonged longitudinal coverage to test for period effects, by modeling country-
year as a separate level it will also be possible to control for the confounding ef-
fects of time. All individual-level predictors of satisfaction were included at level 1, 
whereas income inequality was added at the country-year level (level 2). Based on 
the results from previous studies on satisfaction with democracy, where citizens in 
post-Communist countries show significantly lower levels of satisfaction, a dummy 
variable measuring whether a country has a Communist past or not is included at 
level 3 (country). Additionally, we also include a measure of unemployment as a 
time-invariant predictor at level 3, by averaging yearly measurements (e.g. Toka, 
1995; Clarke et al., 1993; Sen, 1997).
Empirical Results
In the following paragraphs, we turn to the multilevel models which provide the 
main body of evidence on the basis of which we draw our conclusions (Table 1 on 
pp. 60-61). Our main theoretical interest lies in the dynamics of the effect of age 
(an individual-level predictor) on satisfaction with democracy, and how this varies 
across contexts at different levels of income inequality (a country-year level predic-
tor). We try to ascertain this by means of a two-way cross-level interaction between 
the predictors mentioned above. To better understand the cross-country differences 
in expected average satisfaction with democracy, and to see whether satisfaction 
depends on levels of income inequality, we first present an illustration of estimated 
country-means for satisfaction (simple varying intercept model with no substantive 
predictors included presented in Model 1) with the observed levels of income in-
equality across countries. Figure 1 shows that in 2002 the relationship between Gini 
and satisfaction with democracy goes in an unexpected direction: in countries with 
higher levels of income inequality average levels of satisfaction are in fact some-
what higher, partly due to the odd cases of Portugal and Greece in 2002. However, 
in all other survey years higher income inequality is apparently associated with 
lower levels of satisfaction. Moreover, in 2008 and 2010 we see a significant drop 
in satisfaction, especially in countries with higher income inequality.
Model 1 includes all individual-level predictors of satisfaction with democracy 
and, as can be easily spotted from the table, all estimates are statistically signifi-
cant. All predictors have a positive effect, as observed in other similar analyses as 
well, including the effect of age. The most interesting effect relates to the predictors 
which constitute our main theoretical focus: age and the 90s generation. On aver-
age, even after controlling for a host of individual-level predictors, young people 
do exhibit a lower level of satisfaction with democracy. This effect varies across 
countries both in direction and magnitude, and it is the reason why we introduce a 
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Table 1. Satisfaction with Democracy and Cross-Sectional Income Inequality
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 4.97*** 5.91*** 5.87*** 5.87*** 5.88*** 5.74*** 5.75***
(0.20) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
Age 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
90s-00s cohort 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.29**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Female 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political interest 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-Communist - -1.55*** -1.42*** -1.45*** -1.43*** -1.56*** -1.58***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28)
Unemployment - -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Inequality 
(cross-sectional) - -0.10
** -0.10** -0.10** -0.09** -0.11** -0.11**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age × Inequality 
(cross-sectional) - - 0.01
** - 0.01* 0.01*** -
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -
90s × Inequality 
(cross-sectional) - - - -0.02
** 0.00 - -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) - (0.01)
AIC 683774 683750 683271 683473 683263 642889 643084
BIC 683873 683880 683430 683632 683462 643047 643242
Log Likelihood -341877 -341862 -341620 -341720 -341612 -321428 -321526
Observations 154524 154524 154524 154524 154524 146245 146245
Groups: country 
years 113 113 113 113 113 108 108
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random effect for age in subsequent models. Members of the 1990s cohort seem to 
be slightly more satisfied than all other cohorts. Other demographic variables, such 
as education, household income and gender are also statistically significant. Sa-
tisfaction is higher among females, those who have higher levels of education and 
who have a higher income; however, the magnitude of these effects is rather small. 
We also find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for political interest, 
which was expected. Note, however, that these variables serve merely as controls 
for the effect of age; we do not imply any type of causal relationship.
In Figure 2 (on the next page) we present the way in which the effect of age on 
satisfaction with democracy varies for different levels of aggregate income inequal-
ity, as a preliminary (un-modeled) visual inspection of the relationship. The figure 
suggests that young people are less satisfied with democracy than older people in 
countries where income inequality is higher, with the clearest relationship being 
observed in 2002. Interestingly, in 2008, with the onset of the global crisis, the age 
differences in satisfaction are reduced regardless of income inequality levels. The 
panels for 2010 and 2012 reveal the complexity of the relationship: age differences 
substantially rise with income inequality, but only up to a point. The macro-micro 
interaction seems to follow a weak, but apparent, curvilinear pattern. As such a re-
















1.32 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Residual 
variance 4.87 2.21 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.17 2.18
Note: All models were estimated with linear mixed model fi t by REML in R (v. 3.1.2.), lme4 
package (v. 1.1.7). Each model was run with 100 different plausible values for Gini. Estimates 
of fi xed effects pooled using Rubin’s rules. Estimates of random effects and model fi t statistics 
obtained by averaging over the 100 iterations. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p<0.1.
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lationship could only be modeled in a more flexible estimation framework, such as 
with the Bayesian one, we do not pursue this avenue further. In countries with pro-
nounced income differences, attitudinal age differences disappear. Figure 3 (on the 
next page) reveals the same pattern for the discrete change in average levels of sa-
tisfaction for our cohort of interest. Respondents who grew up in the 1990s or 2000s 
are less satisfied than other respondents in countries with higher income inequality.
To test our hypothesis thoroughly we add the Gini index as a predictor of satis-
faction, and we also control for the effect of levels of unemployment and post-Com-
munism (see Model 2). The results confirm the findings of Krieckhaus et al. (2013) 
and go against those of Magalhães (2014), in finding a negative effect of inequality 
on satisfaction with democracy. The effects of income inequality are not major, but 
neither can they be considered substantively meaningless. In our sample, within an 
ESS wave, income inequality has a standard deviation of roughly 5 points. Moving 
from a country with a level of inequality roughly placed at one standard deviation 
below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, would reduce the aver-
age level of satisfaction by about 1 point. Such a move is experienced in our sample 
by Bulgaria, which between 2003 and 2011 gained close to 10 Gini points. In Model 
3 we implicitly test the relationship from Figure 2 by including the cross-level in-
teraction term between income inequality and age. As a reminder, it is important to 
point out that the Gini used for this indicator of political performance captures only 
between-country differences in inequality. This variable has been obtained by re-
placing the Gini measurement for each year for a particular country by the average 
of Gini across time for that country. In this manner, all within-country variation in 
inequality has been erased, leaving only between-country variation. In the second 
stage, the variable was grand-mean centered prior to including it in the interaction. 
In this sense, the interaction effect captures only between-country Gini trends, ra-
ther than longitudinal ones. 
It is clear from the table that the effect of inequality on satisfaction with demo-
cracy manifests itself more strongly for younger people than for older ones. Young 
people most likely react to the diminished prospects for their future in terms of up-
ward mobility and re-evaluate their views on regime performance in light of the 
ample evidence of unfair economic outcomes. However, as we postulated before, it 
is also likely that income inequality has an impact on those respondents who spent 
their formative years during the period when income inequality grew in most of the 
countries in the sample. We test this relationship by specifying another cross-level 
interaction term, this time between our 1990s-2000s cohort dummy and Gini (Mo-
del 4). The initial conclusions based on un-modeled relationship plotted in Figu-
re 3 are confirmed: the effect of inequality is slightly more potent for individuals 
born in the last three decades of the 20th century than for the generations that pre-
ceded them. Including a cross-level interaction between income inequality and both 
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age and our cohort indicator does not change the main effect of income inequality 
on satisfaction with democracy, or the statistical significance of the interaction be-
tween inequality and age (see Model 5). The interaction between inequality and the 
1990s cohort, however, becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
We further test whether this result is sensitive to the inclusion of countries with 
a particularly high level of income inequality (Turkey and Russia) in our sample. 
The results, presented in Models 6 and 7, show this not to be the case. In both cases, 
however, the estimates are statistically significant, leading us to firmly conclude 
that a moderation effect is at play between income inequality and a respondent’s 
age. In an attempt to further probe into the precise nature of the relationship be-
tween income inequality and satisfaction with democracy, we tested for whether the 
relationship is both cross-sectional and longitudinal. Results are presented in Table 
2 (on pp. 68-69). We do this following the method proposed by Fairbrother (2014), 
by also constructing a longitudinal type of Gini: for each country in the sample, 
we computed the deviation of each Gini measurement from the average Gini level 
in the country over time. This procedure essentially removes all between-country 
variation in income inequality, keeping just the within-country, over-time variation. 
This provides us with two predictors which are orthogonal to each other and can 
help determine whether the relationship we observe between inequality and demo-
cratic satisfaction also holds longitudinally or not. The presence of different cross-
sectional and longitudinal trends in satisfaction with democracy mirrors the results 
obtained by Fairbrother and Martin (2013) in the context of the US, with respect to 
social trust. In their analysis, the authors find that the association between income 
inequality and social trust corroborated by other studies only holds in a cross-sec-
tional perspective. The results presented here indicate a similar trend. In none of the 
three models presented in Table 2 are the effects for income inequality statistically 
significant. Furthermore, neither can we find evidence of a cross-level interaction 
between inequality and age.
One potential reason why we have come up short when probing the interac-
tions in a longitudinal perspective could be the fact that our sample covers only a 
period of 10 years for our countries; in this limited time span, most variance in in-
equality is at the cross-country level rather than the cross-temporal one. This lack of 
variation in the inequality measure for the longitudinal model is the most plausible 
suspect for why we do not find the expected, significant results. 
Conclusions
Our aim in this analysis has been to test the dynamics of support for democracy: 
how this varies across age groups and cohorts, and between contexts with lower 
and higher levels of income inequality. To achieve this, we have relied on the data 
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Table 2. Satisfaction with Democracy and Longitudinal Income Inequality
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
(Intercept) 6.21*** 6.19*** 6.20***
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Age 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
90s-00s cohort 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Female 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political interest 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-Communist -1.56*** -1.46*** -1.51***
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Unemployment -0.08† -0.09† -0.09†
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Inequality (longitudinal) 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age × Inequality (longitudinal) - 0.00 -
(0.01)
90s × Inequality (longitudinal) - - -0.02
   (0.03)
AIC 683760 683290 683491
BIC 683889 683449 683650
Log Likelihood -341867 -341629 -341729
Observations 154524 154524 154524
Groups: country years 113 113 113
Groups: country 34 34 34
Intercept variance: country years 0.46 0.46 0.46
Slope variance (country years): age - 0.09 -
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source provided by the six waves of the ESS and Frederick Solt’s SWIID data for 
measures of income inequality. A series of hierarchical linear models have offered 
us a rich description of the variability of the effects of income inequality on satis-
faction with democracy, as well as whether these manifest themselves in a cross-
sectional or longitudinal setting.
The results mainly speak to the strong association between income inequality 
at the national level and an individual’s level of satisfaction with democracy. As evi-
denced by the consistently negative and statistically significant estimate for income 
inequality, even when controlling for a host of individual-level and country-level 
predictors, more unequal contexts display, on average, lower levels of satisfaction 
with democracy. With respect to the damaging effects of income inequality, our re-
sults confirm those of Schäfer (2012) and go against those of Magalhães (2014). 
Furthermore, these negative effects are more severely felt by the younger portion 
of the citizenry. Results also suggest that cohort experience matters, as citizens who 
grew up in times of rising inequality have slightly more pessimistic attitudes to-
wards democratic performance. The implications of these findings certainly depend 
on a variety of additional factors which we have not been able to control for in our 
models, although they would appear to tentatively point in the direction of a grow-
ing dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions if inequality trends continue 
unabated. Recent statistics published by Eurostat suggest this to have been the case: 
when compared to the levels observed in 2008, income inequality has increased 
in a considerable number of Western and Eastern European countries.1 In the face 
of such a trend, our results indicate that the next few electoral cycles should bring 
about an electorate which is increasingly unhappy with how government functions 
and the outputs it produces. Even if future decades were to bring about lower levels 
of inequality (at this moment there is no indication of such a trend), the influence 
1 Results can be found at the following address: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.
do?dataset=ilc_di12 (accessed December 14, 2014).
Slope variance (country years): 90s - - 0.28
Intercept variance: country 0.74 0.75 0.74
Residual variance 2.21 2.20 2.20
Note: All models were estimated with linear mixed model fi t by REML in R (v. 3.1.2.), lme4 
package (v. 1.1.7). Each model was run with 100 different plausible values for Gini. Estimates 
of fi xed effects pooled using Rubin’s rules. Estimates of random effects and model fi t statistics 
obtained by averaging over the 100 iterations. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p 
< 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p<0.1.
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of events which took place as young citizens were reaching political maturity might 
weigh more than that of future ones. To the extent that growing political dissatisfac-
tion is joined in its manifestation by an increasing willingness to join protests, high-
er volatility in voting patterns, and increasing likelihood of responding to messages 
from extremist or niche parties, the findings presented above suggest a pessimistic 
picture for democratic life in the following electoral cycles.
We must, before concluding, take note of a series of limitations which our 
study has been unable to correct for. Future research should re-test the relationships 
we uncover in our analyses as more waves of the ESS are made available. A longer 
time series could address the issue of limited observations for income inequality for 
each country and offer a stronger test of the effect which inequality has on satisfac-
tion with democracy, particularly the existence of a longitudinal one. Finally, we 
bring up the issue of the additional factors at the country- and country-year levels 
which could presumably influence satisfaction with democracy, but for which we 
would need a larger sample size at the country-year level. For instance, even af-
ter we control for economic inequality, post-Communist national contexts display 
lower levels of satisfaction with democracy. This finding, by now consistent across 
studies on satisfaction with democracy, indicates that other factors, such as a dis-
tinct political culture, the performance of political institutions or the degree of po-
litical corruption, should be placed in the spotlight of studies on democratic legiti-
macy. Furthermore, there are other economic factors, aside from aggregate levels of 
inequality, which could explain differences in satisfaction with democracy among 
social groups. As mentioned before, young people now live in more precarious eco-
nomic conditions than their parents and grandparents faced. This trend could be ex-
plored further by analyzing the impact of economic insecurity on citizen attitudes 
towards regime performance. Citizens who live in a more secure economic environ-
ment, where the risk of economic loss is small, might be more satisfied with the way 
democracy works in their country, especially compared to those citizens who live 
in countries where institutional safety-nets are not efficient in providing protection 
against volatile changes in the economy.
REFERENCES
Alwin, D . F. and Krosnick, J. A. 1991. Aging, Cohorts, and the Stability of Sociopolitical 
Orientations Over the Life Span. American Journal of Sociology, 97 (1): 169-195.
Andersen, R. 2012. Support for democracy in cross-national perspective: The detrimen-
tal effect of economic inequality. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 30 
(4): 389-402.
Širinić, D., Bosancianu, C. M., Génération Désenchantée: Satisfaction with Democracy...
71
Anderson, C. J. and Just, A. 2012. Partisan legitimacy across generations. Electoral 
Studies, 31 (2): 306-316.
Anderson, C. J. & Singer, M. M. 2008. The Sensitive Left and the Impervious Right. 
Multilevel Models and the Politics of Inequality, Ideology, and Legitimacy in Eu-
rope. Comparative Political Studies, 41 (4-5): 564-599.
Anderson, C. J. and Guillory, C. A. 1997. Political institutions and satisfaction with de-
mocracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 91 (1): 66-81.
Arnett, J. J. 2006. Emerging Adulthood in Europe: A Response to Bynner. Journal of 
Youth Studies, 9 (1): 111-123.
Beck, P. A. and Jennings, M. K. 1982. Pathways to Participation. The American Political 
Science Review, 76 (1): 94-108.
Braun, D. 1991. Income Inequality and Economic Development. Social Science Quar-
terly, 71: 520-536.
Clarke, H., Dutt, N. & Kornberg, A. 1993. The Political Economy of Attitudes toward 
Polity and Society in Western European Democracies. Journal of Politics, 55: 998-
1021.
Dahl, R. A. 2006. On political equality. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dalton, R. J. 2004. Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion in politi-
cal support in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dalton, R. J. 2006. Citizen politics: public opinion and political parties in advanced in-
dustrial democracies. London: Chatham House.
Dalton, R. J. 2011. Engaging youth in politics. Budapest: Open Society Institute.
Delli Carpini, M. X. 1989. Age and History: Generations and Sociopolitical Change, in: 
Roberta S. Sigel (ed.), Political learning in adulthood: A source book of theory and 
research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1-11.
Easton, D. 1957. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics, 9 
(3): 383-400.
Easton, D. 1965. A systems analysis of political life. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons.
Enders, C. K. & Tofighi, D. 2007. Centering Predictor Variables in Cross-Sectional Mul-
tilevel Models: A New Look at an Old Issue. Psychological Methods, 12 (2): 121-
138.
Fairbrother, M. 2014. Two Multilevel Modeling Techniques for Analyzing Comparative 
Longitudinal Survey Datasets. Political Science Research and Methods, 2: 119-140.
Fairbrother, M. & Martin, I. W. 2013. Does inequality erode social trust? Results from 
multilevel models of US states and counties. Social Science Research, 42 (2): 347-
360.
Fredriksen, K. B. 2012. Income Inequality in the European Union. Paris: OECD Pub-
lishing.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 51-73
72
Furlong, A. & Cartmel, F. 2006. Young people and social change. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Galbraith, J. K. & Hale, J. T. 2008. State Income Inequality and Presidential Election 
Turnout and Outcomes. Social Science Quarterly, 89 (4): 887-901.
Grasso, M. T. 2014. Age, period and cohort analysis in a comparative context: Politi-
cal generations and political participation repertoires in Western Europe. Electoral 
Studies, 33: 63-76.
ILO. 2013. Global Employment Trends for Youth 2013: A generation at risk. Interna-
tional Labour Organization.
ITUC. 2012. The Social Crisis Behind the Economic Crisis – the Millions of Young Peo-
ple Unemployed. International Trade Union Confederation.
Kenworthy, L. & Pontusson, J. 2005. Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution 
in Affluent Countries. Perspectives on Politics, 3 (3): 449-471.
Krieckhaus, J., Son, B., Bellinger, N. M. & Wells, J. M. 2013. Economic Inequality and 
Democratic Support. Journal of Politics, 76 (1): 1-13.
Lancee, B. & Van de Werfhorst, H. G. 2012. Income inequality and participation: A com-
parison of 24 European countries. Social Science Research, 41 (5): 1166-1178.
Linde, J. and Ekman, J. 2003. Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used 
indicator in comparative politics. European Journal of Political Research, 42 (3): 
391-408.
Lipset, S. M. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53 (1): 69-105.
Lister, M. 2007. Institutions, inequality and social norms: Explaining variations in par-
ticipation. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9 (1): 20-35.
Magalhães, P. C. 2014. Government effectiveness and support for democracy. European 
Journal of Political Research, 53 (1): 77-97.
Mieriņa, I. & Cers, E. 2014. Is Communism to Blame for Political Disenchantment in 
Post-Communist Countries? Cohort Analysis of Adults’ Political Attitudes. Europe-
Asia Studies, 66 (7): 1031-1061.
Neundorf, A. and Niemi, R. G. 2014. Beyond political socialization: new approaches to 
age, period, cohort analysis. Electoral Studies, 33: 1-6.
Norris, P. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Norris, P. 2002. Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
OECD. 2013a. Crisis squeezes income and puts pressure on inequality and poverty. Pa-
ris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. 2013b. Divided We Stand. Why Inequality Keeps Rising?. Paris: OECD Publish-
ing.
Širinić, D., Bosancianu, C. M., Génération Désenchantée: Satisfaction with Democracy...
73
Powell, G. B. 1982. Contemporary Democracies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. 1993. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rubin, D. B. 1987. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. Hoboken: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Salverda, W., Nolan, B. & Smeeding, T. M. 2009. Introduction, in: W. Salverda, B. Nolan 
and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 3-22.
Schäfer, A. 2012. Affluence, inequality and satisfaction with democracy, in: Silke I., Keil 
and Oscar W. Gabriel (eds.), Society and Democracy in Europe. London: Rout-
ledge, 139-161.
Sears, D. O. and Valentino, N. A. 1997. Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts 
for Preadult Socialization. The American Political Science Review, 91 (1): 45-65.
Sen, A. M. 1997. Inequality, unemployment and contemporary Europe. International La-
bour Review, 136: 155-171.
Sen, A. M. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sloam, J. 2012. New Voice, Less Equal: The Civic and Political Engagement of Young 
People in the United States and Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 47 (5): 663-
688.
Snijders, T. & Bosker, R. 1999. Multilevel Analysis: An introduction to basic and ad-
vanced multilevel modeling. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Solt, F. 2009. Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. Social Science 
Quarterly, 90 (2): 231-242.
Solt, F. 2010. Does economic inequality depress electoral participation? Testing the 
Schattschneider hypothesis. Political Behavior, 32 (2): 285-301.
Steenbergen, M. & Jones, B. S. 2002. Modeling multilevel data structures. American 
Journal of Political Science, 46 (1): 218-237.
Toka, G. 1995. Political support in East-Central Europe, in: H. D. Klingemann and D. 
Fuchs (eds.), Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 354-382.
Torney-Purta, J. 2004. Adolescents’ Political Socialization in Changing Contexts: An 
International Study in the Spirit of Nevitt Sanford. Political Psychology, 25 (3): 
465-478.
Mailing Addresses:
Daniela Širinić, Faculty of Political Sciences, Lepušićeva 6, 10 000 Zagreb, Croa-
tia. E-mail: dsirinic@gmail.com
Constantin Manuel Bosancianu, Central European University, Nador utca 9, 
H-1051 Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: manuel.bosancianu@gmail.com
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 51-73
